Impact of the ability and the degree of openness of a manager on decision making is studied. Whether a more able manager increases or decreases the effort of a subordinate depends on the relative quality of information. Greater openness is a two-edged sword: it increases the likelihood that more information will be employed, but it reduces the manager's incentive to expend effort on obtaining better information. A more open manager is more desirable when the position is relatively more important or the prior information is not very accurate.
Introduction
Managerial decision making is very important for various kinds of organizations.
Companies spend significant amount of resources to find CEOs to match their needs. As a manager plays a leading role to his subordinates, the ability of a manager is a concern.
2 Even though a manager has a high level of ability, he usually does not have the time or sufficient amount of information to make a decision. Thus whether a manager is open to opinions of others is relevant to the quality of the decision made. 3 There are some interesting questions about managerial decision making. First, how is the behavior of a manager affected by his ability and his degree of openness? Second, how is the behavior of subordinates affected by the 1 We thank Vinod Agarwal, John Chao, Leo Michelis, David Selover, Daniel Vincent, John M. Virgo, Gilbert
Yochum, and anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. We are solely responsible for the mistakes. 2 The importance of ability of a leader is discussed in detail in Selznick (1957) . The more uncertain the environment a firm operates in, the more important the role of a manager as a leader.
personalities of the managers? Third, what kind of personality is desirable for a manager?
Finally, if we have to choose among different merits of good manager, which merit is most desirable?
In this paper, we study the impact of the ability and the degree of openness of a manager on decision making. A manager plays many roles, such as decision making, supervision of subordinates, and participation in production directly. Here we emphasize the decision making role of a manager rather than other roles of a manager. For a manager with a large number of subordinates, this emphasis on decision making is appropriate. For example, for the CEO of the General Motors, whether to keep or develop a new brand of cars is much more important than to engage in the production of cars directly. One contribution of this paper is that we study the information aggregation role of a manager in a formal model. In this paper, a manager needs to estimate the true value of a parameter. A manager may rely on his information only or also consult the information of his subordinates. A more able manager is modeled as a manager with a more precise estimate of the parameter needed for decision making. A more open manager is modeled as a manager who is more likely to consult subordinates for information.
First, when the degree of precision is exogenous and a leader chooses the number of followers optimally, we show that a more able manager consults a lower number of subordinates.
The number of subordinates consulted does not change with the degree of openness of the manager. Second, when the number of subordinates is exogenously given and the level of precision is determined by effort level, a sufficient condition for the manager's effort to increase and the subordinate's effort to decrease with the ability of the manager is that the quality of prior information is relatively good. In the literature on a manager's vision, Rotemberg and Saloner (1993) have studied a model in which contracts between the firm and mangers are incomplete. In Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) , a manager with a vision biases him in favor of certain projects. This affects the type of projects implemented and thus affects the incentives of subordinates because subordinates can be compensated for their innovative ideas only when their ideas get implemented. In Van den Steen (2005) , after knowing the preferences of the managers, workers choose companies to work for. A manager with strong beliefs about the right course of action will attract subordinates with similar beliefs. This alignment of beliefs between managers and workers in the same company gives direction to the firm and affects incentives and coordination.
In the above models, the role of a manager is significantly different from that in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we specify the model. Second, we examine the optimal choice of the number of subordinates when the degree of precision is exogenously given. Third, we address the impact of ability and openness on behavior when higher effort levels improve the degree of precision. Fourth, we study effort levels when the number of subordinates and the level of precision are all optimally chosen. Optimal selection of a manager is also discussed. Finally, we discuss some generalizations of the model and conclude.
Specification of the Model
In this section, we specify the model. There is a manager and a pool of subordinates. A decision needs to be made and the quality of the decision depends on the estimation of the true value of an unknown parameter  . The decision may be whether to initiate a new investment project. The parameter to be estimated is the profitability of the project. There are alternative interpretations of the manager and the subordinates. For example, the configuration can be a president deciding how many advisors to consult before making a decision.
The prior belief about the parameter  is that it follows a normal distribution with mean There is an unlimited supply of subordinates. The number of subordinates actually consulted by the manager is n . It is assumed that observations between the manager and any subordinate are independent. It is also assumed that observations among subordinates are also independent.
Each subordinate has one observation with a precision of s p , 0  s p . 4 For a normal distribution, the precision is the inverse of the variance. Here precision rather than variance is used because the usage of precision simplifies presentation.
5 By having this compound term of precision, later on we are able to separate the impact of a change of ability through  and a change of effort through m e then m p .
The manager is assumed to be risk neutral and his objective is to minimize the total cost which is the sum of the decision loss and the opportunity cost of the manager and possible payments to subordinates. For a denoting a positive constant, the loss function is assumed to be 
, suppose that the manager uses both his information and the information from his subordinates t percent of the time and uses his information only for the rest of the time.
The value of t is determined by the personality of the manager and it may be viewed as the style of the manager. Here, t is a parameter used to measure the manager's degree of openness or tolerance ( t stands for tolerance). With this view in mind, t is assumed to be exogenous in this model. When t is equal to zero, the manager does not put any weight on the information gathered by the subordinates. In this case, the manager is viewed as not open. This possibility 6 In reality, the penalty to the manager for erring in one direction in predicting the parameter can be larger than in the other direction. For example, in the case of profitability of a project, overestimation might be a worse loss than underestimation. We thank an anonymous referee for this insight. This type of loss can be addressed by a loss function depending on the absolute value of error. Minimizing a least square loss is easier to handle than minimizing least absolute value because there is a kink in the absolute loss function and this makes differentiation less convenient.
can be rationalized by arguing that the manager does not trust the information provided by the subordinates. When t is equal to one, the manager puts equal weight on his own observation and the observation provided by the subordinates. In this case, the manager is viewed as completely open. This configuration can apply when the manager views himself as a member of a committee and each member of the committee plays equal role. With the above specification, the degree of openness increases with t . The manager knows the value of t himself. The manager may also determine the number of subordinates to consult.
Total cost is the sum of expected loss and the opportunity cost of the manager and payment to the subordinates. The opportunity cost of the manager is u . The wage rate paid to a subordinate is w . When the manager relies on his own information only, the manager will set the estimation equal to the expected value and the posterior precision is 
  
. The wage cost is w n . Thus the total expected cost for a manager with a degree of openness t is equal to
In the following three sections, we study the impact of the manager's ability and the degree of openness under different configurations.
Optimal Choice of the Number of Subordinates
In this section, the levels of the precisions of individuals are exogenous.
The manager chooses the number of subordinates to consult to minimize total expected cost. From (1), the first order condition for the optimal choice of the number of subordinates is
The following proposition studies the impact of the ability of the manager on the number of subordinates consulted. Proposition 1: When the level of precision is exogenous, a more able manager consults a lower number of subordinates.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the marginal benefit of consulting a subordinate decreases when a manager becomes more able. As a result, the number of subordinates consulted decreases.
The following proposition studies the degree of openness of the manager on the number of subordinates consulted.
Proposition 2: When the levels of precisions are exogenous, the number of subordinates does not change with the degree of openness of a manager.
Proof: From (2), it can be shown that 0 /  dt dn .
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Once a manager decides to consult followers for information, the number of subordinates consulted is determined by the marginal cost and marginal benefit of consulting an additional subordinate. Since the marginal cost and marginal benefit are not affected by the degree of openness (see footnote 6), the number of subordinates consulted is not affected by the degree of openness.
From (2), we can also establish the following results. First, the number of subordinates consulted decreases with the degree of precision of the information provided by a subordinate.
The reason is that the marginal benefit of consulting a subordinate decreases. Second, the number of subordinates consulted also decreases with the wage rate since a higher wage rate increases the cost of consulting a subordinate. Third, the number of subordinates consulted also decreases with the quality of prior information. The reason is that a higher quality of prior information decreases the marginal benefit to consult a subordinate. Finally, when the decision risk increases, the number of subordinates consulted increases.
Precision Determined by Effort Level
Since it takes time to hire new employees, for a manager in the short run, the number of subordinates can be viewed as fixed. In this section, we study the case that the number of subordinates is exogenously given. However, the levels of precisions are determined by effort level. 
. That is, the cost of effort increases with the level of effort and the cost function is convex. The effort level of the subordinate is assumed to be observable to the manager. 8 In this case, the wage rate to a subordinate will be set to equal to the cost of effort of a subordinate. The opportunity cost to the manager is replaced by the cost of exerting effort. The manager chooses m e and s e to minimize total expected cost:
The first order conditions for cost minimization with respect to efforts are 0 ) (
8 Here the manager controls the effort of the subordinates by providing the corresponding wage rate through the cost function of the subordinates. It is assumed that the manager can control the effort of a subordinate perfectly. In the principal-agent literature, the principal may observe a noisy rather than a perfect signal of the effort of the agent.
For literature on mechanism design, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Manelli and Vincent (1995) . Suppose that under an optimally designed incentive scheme, the optimal effort level of a subordinate increases with the level of reward such as wage rate. Then our assumption of perfect observability can be viewed as a reduced form of a full-fledged mechanism design model with imperfect observability.
Equations (4) and (5) form a system of two equations defining m e and s e implicitly.
Differentiation of equations (4) and (5) 
Let   denote the determinant of the above coefficient matrix. For stability, it is assumed that 0    . 9 The following proposition studies the impact of the manager's ability on the effort levels.
Proposition 3: When the number of subordinates is exogenous, a sufficient condition for
Proof: Partial differentiation of (4) leads to
Application of Cramer's rule to (6) yields 
11
The interpretation of Proposition 3 is as follows. The effort of the manager is determined by the marginal cost and marginal benefit of exerting effort. When  changes, the marginal cost does not change since  does not enter into the cost function. From (4), there are two effects on the marginal benefit: one direct effect and one indirect effect through s e . One interpretation of (7) is that the prior information is relatively accurate. When (7) is valid, for the direct effect, the marginal benefit of higher effort from the manager increases with the value of  . For the indirect effect, a higher  decreases the effort of a subordinate and increases marginal benefit for the manager. Thus, when (7) is valid, the two effects work in the same direction. As a result, the effort level of the manager increases with the ability of the manager. When (7) is not satisfied, from the direct effect, marginal benefit decreases; and from the indirect effect, marginal benefit increases. The two effects work in opposite directions and whether the effort of the manager increases with the ability of the manager or not depends on which effect is stronger. Impact of a change of  on the effort of a subordinate can be illustrated in a similar way. information is relatively precise. In this case, a higher level of effort of a subordinate is less valuable.
Optimal Choice of Subordinates and Precision
In the long run, a manager may be able to control both the number of subordinates and control the incentives of the subordinates and thus effort levels of the subordinates. In this section, we study the situation in which the number of subordinates, and the effort level of a subordinate, and the effort level of the manager are all optimally chosen. We also study how the total cost is affected by the ability and the degree of openness of the manager. The manager chooses his effort level, the number of subordinates, and the effort level of a subordinate to minimize the expected cost:
The first order condition for the optimal number of subordinates is
In addition, equations (4) and (5) are still valid. From equations (4), (5), and (9), we get the following system of three equations defining three variables n , m e , and s e implicitly:
(12)
Differentiation of (10)- (12) with respect to n , m e , s e ,  , and t leads to The following proposition provides a sufficient condition for the number of subordinates consulted to decrease and the effort of the manager to increase with the ability of the manager. is that (7) is
As discussed previously, if (7) is valid, the marginal benefit of effort of a manager increases with the manager's ability. Thus, the effort of a manager increases with his ability. An increase of the ability of the manager has two effects on the choice of the number of subordinates. If (7) is valid, the two effects work in the same direction and the number of subordinates decreases with the ability of the manager; if (7) is not valid, the two effects work in opposite directions and whether the number of subordinates decreases or increases depends on which effect is stronger.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, when the level of precision is endogenously determined, it can also be shown that the effort level of a subordinate does not change with the ability of the manager.
The following proposition studies the manager's degree of openness on the number of subordinates consulted when effort levels are optimally chosen. , and
Since a more open manager is more likely to consult subordinates for information, the marginal benefit of effort of a manager decreases and the marginal benefit of the effort of a subordinate increases. As a result, the effort level of the manager decreases with his degree of openness. As the effort of the manager decreases, from the right-hand side of (10), the marginal benefit of consulting one additional subordinate increases. As a result, the number of subordinates consulted increases. Comparing Proposition 6 with Proposition 1, in Proposition 6, the change of the effort of the manager acts as one additional channel for the degree of openness to affect the number of subordinates consulted.
Interestingly, the effort level of a subordinate is unaffected by the degree of openness of the manager. The reason is that the leader can choose both the number of subordinates and the effort level of subordinates. For a given number of subordinates, the marginal benefit of effort of a subordinate increases with the degree of openness of the manager. Since the number of subordinates increases with the degree of openness, and a higher number of subordinates decreases the marginal benefit of effort from a subordinate, the two effects cancel each other and the equilibrium effort level of a subordinate is not affected by the degree of openness of the manager.
Similar to the proof of Propositions 5 and 6, it can be shown that a higher level of prior precision decreases the effort level of the manager. The impact of better prior information on the number of subordinates consulted in ambiguous. The effort level of a subordinate is unaffected to the level of prior precision.
For the rest of this section, we study the impact of a change of the ability or openness of the manager on the value function as defined in (8). The following proposition studies the relationship between the total cost and the ability of a manager.
Proposition 7: Total cost decreases with the ability of the manager.
Proof: Application of envelope theorem on (8) 
Proposition 7 is consistent with common sense that a more able manager is more desirable. From equation (8), the ability of a manager affects the total cost through two channels: the direct channel through itself and an indirect channel through the effort level and the number of subordinates because the effort level and the number of subordinates consulted are affected by the ability of the manager. The impact of the direct channel is that the total cost always decreases with the ability of the manager. Because the impact of the indirect channel is not straightforward, it is not immediately clear that the total cost always decreases with the ability of the manager. When the effort level and the number of subordinates are optimally chosen in equilibrium, the impact of the indirect channel vanishes. As a result, the total impact is that total cost decreases when the ability of the manager increases.
The following proposition studies the relationship between the value of total cost and the degree of openness of a manager. Liu was not good at leading an army but he was good at listening to the opinions of his followers and famous of using incentives to motivate his followers. Some highly talented individuals left Xiang and joined Liu after they figured out that Liu was more open to the opinions of followers.
Even though Xiang had a much larger army than Liu initially, Liu finally won the competition and became the founding emperor of the Han Dynasty.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied a model in which a manager needs to make a decision based on the information available. A more able manager has a higher level of precision of the Suppose one individual has a more precise estimation of the profitability of projects than others.
If this individual believes a project will be profitable, this individual may appear to be enthusiastic to this project. This enthusiasm can be viewed as charisma. Thus, it may be rational for individuals with less precise estimation to follow those enthusiastic ones or people with charisma. Second, selection of managers can be studied. In this paper, the designation of a manager is not addressed. In reality, managers can be chosen through various ways. One is related to the previous discussion through a reputation of charisma. Another one is a process of tournament. Is it more likely that a more able individual will win the tournament and become the manager? Not necessarily. As pointed out by Lazear (1989) , to win a tournament, individuals may also engage in sabotage activities, rather than just choosing productive effort levels. It is not always true that a more able individual is also better in sabotage activities. Finally, different merits of a manager may have different values under different scenarios. For example, the ability to make a decision in a reasonable amount of time may be more important in emergency than in a routine time period. How the environment affects the merits of managerial decision making may be an interesting avenue for future research.
